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Awash in Soft Money and Political Corruption: The
Need for Campaign Finance Reform
Then one of the twelve, called Judas Iscariot, went into the chief priests,
and said unto them, what will ye give me, and I will deliver [Jesus Christ]
unto you? And they bargained with him for thirty pieces of silver. And from
that time he sought opportunity to betray him. - Matthew 26: 14-16

INTRODUCTION

This Biblical story of Judas Iscariot's betrayal of Jesus Christ for
thirty pieces of silver, recorded nearly 2,000 years ago, illustrates
the powerful and often corrupting influence of money. During his
life, Jesus Christ, one of the most influential public figures of all
times, led a revolution of sorts that began a radical transformation
of the political landscape of Judea. The religious and political
leaders perceived Jesus as a threat to the political establishment,
and therefore, plotted to kill him. In furtherance of their nefarious
plan, they solicited the support of one of Jesus' closest friends,
Judas Iscariot. The price of betrayal: thirty pieces of silver.
Judas' reasoning for betraying his master and closest friend will
never be fully understood. Judas was, however, undoubtedly
motivated by greed, power, and a large sum of money. It is
self-evident that Judas would not have betrayed Jesus for one, five,
or even ten pieces of silver. Betrayal came at a much higher price.
In many respects, the story of Judas Iscariot parallels the story
of this country's 1996 presidential election year. Each is a sordid
tale of greed, money, betrayal, and the quest for power and
influence. A number of disturbing issues surfaced in 1996
concerning the influence of large money contributions on federal
elections, particularly the presidential race. Mounting evidence
strongly suggests that large political contributions directly
influenced decisions bearing upon American domestic and foreign
policies. The potentially corrupting influence of large campaign
donations on this nation's highest elected offices, particularly the
presidency, threatens to unravel the very fabric of our democratic
system.
Part I of this comment discusses reports of the corrupting
influence of large money contributions on American presidential
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elections, United States' domestic and foreign policy, presidential
appointments, and the interdependence of national parties and their
candidates. Part II discusses the background of current federal
election law and the United States Supreme Court's decisions
involving federal campaign laws. Part Im discusses the inordinate
demand for unlimited soft money contributions and the need for
federal regulations to limit such contributions.
BACKGROUND

Driven by an impassioned desire to win the election and end the
Republican Revolution of 1992, President Clinton aimed to raise
$137 million before the 1996 general election.' The propriety of
various fund-raising tactics employed by the President, Vice
President, and the Democratic National Committee ("DNC") to
reach this aggressive goal has since dominated the media
Revelations regarding improper, and possibly illegal, fund-raising
efforts spawned congressional and grand jury investigations, as
well as prompted calls for the appointment of an independent
2
counsel, to sort out alleged improprieties.
In recent years, the cost of presidential and congressional
campaigns has skyrocketed, due in large measure to the increased
reliance upon television advertising. 3 The Democratic and
Republican parties spent a combined total of $25 million on
campaign advertising in 1972. 4 In 1996, expenditures on such ads
increased to nearly $400 million.5 The two parties were not alone,
however, in soliciting funds for television advertising. Organized
labor also entered the fray, spending nearly $200 million on issue
ads.

6

The virtually insatiable demand for large amounts of campaign
money, combined with federal laws that impose limits on direct
1. 7he Great White House Firesale, THE WASH Tiwm, Mar. 23, 1997, at B2; Jodi Enda &
Robert Rankin, Cash Worry Reached Oval Office: Democratic Pundraising7bok the Time
and Energy of the President and Senior Aides, THE DES MowEs RoGiER, Apr. 3, 1997, at 1.
2. Toni Locy, Exporter Associate Testify in DNC Fund-Raising Probe; Florida
Businessman Says He Told Grand Jurors About Contact urith Clinton Aid, THE WAmSPonr,
Mar. 27, 1997, at A19; Robert Suro and John Harris, Rewno is Now Probing Clinton'
Fund-Raising,THE WASIL PoST, Sept. 21, 1997, at Al.
3. Coalition Praises Departing FCC Commissioner, Urges Clinton to Appoint
Successor Dedicated to Pree 7V Tume for Campaigns, U.S. NEwsw=E (Washington, D.C.), May
28, 1997.
4. Id.

5. Id.
6. Jim Nicholson, The Right Kind of Reform, THiE WAm TIrs, Mar. 6, 1997, at A17.
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contributions to candidates, has compelled candidates and political
parties to resort to desperate fund-raising tactics focusing on "soft
money" contributions. "Soft money" describes contributions to
political parties (as opposed to candidates) that solely support
party-building activities, such as: voter registration, "get out the
vote" drives, issue advocacy, and the purchase of campaign items
7
such as slate cards, bumper stickers, and yard signs.
Unlike direct contributions to candidates, known as "hard
money," federal election laws do not regulate soft money
contributions.8 There are no limitations on the amount of soft
money that an individual, company, labor union, or political action
committee ("PAC") 9 may give to a party.10 The Republican National
Committee ("RNC") and the DNC raised more than $800 million in
soft money contributions in 1996, surpassing the $311 million raised
in 1992.11 The use of soft money is not new, but reliance upon soft
money contributions by donors and candidates seeking to
circumvent federal election laws to finance expensive races has
increased dramatically in recent years.
7. Campaign Finance Reform, 1997 Hearings on S. 25 Before the Senate Comm. on
Rules and Admin., 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Bradley A. Smith, Adjunct Scholar, The
Cato Institute; and Associate Professor of Law, Capital University Law School).
8. The Federal Election Campaign Act ("FECA-) of 1971, as amended, is the body of
law that regulates federal campaign activities and contributions to candidates. 2 U.S.C.
§ 431-442 (1996). FECA states that a "contribution" does not include the following:
[Tihe payment by a State or local committee of a political party of the costs of voter
registration and get-out-the-vote activities conducted by such committee on behalf of
nominees of such party for President and Vice President Provided, That (1) such payments are not for the costs of campaign materials or activities used in
connection with any broadcastfig, newspaper, magazine, billboard, direct mail, or
similar type of general public communication or political advertising..
2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(B)(xii).
9. A "PAC" is a club, association, or other group of persons, formed to receive
campaign contributions used to support particular candidates. Such groups' activities,
including contributions, are regulated by federal and state laws. BLAcK's LAw DIcTIONARY 1108
(6th ed. 1990).
10. Helen Dewar, Ex-Presidential Endorsement; Ford, Carter,Bush Back Campaign
Finance Roorm, THE WAst. Posr, July 25, 1997, at A21. Just recently, former Presidents
Ford, Carter, and Bush joined together to call for the regulation of soft money contributions
Id.
11. Myriam Marquez, Why Would Incumbents Mess With a System That Works for
Them, THE ORLANDO SEnTINE, Apr. 11, 1997, at A29; Pat Griffith, PoliticalMoney Machine
Rolls On Insurance and 7bbacco Give $3 Million to GOP to Influence Regulators,
PrrSBURGH Posr-GAzsr, Aug. 19, 1997, at A6. In addition to the DNC and RNC, other
political havens for soft money contributions include: the parties' respective Senate and
House campaign committees, congressional dinner committees, and state and local
committees. Id. The vast majority of soft money, however, is donated directly to the DNC
and RNC. Id.
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THE CORRUPTING INFLUENCE OF LARGE MONEY CONTRIBUTIONS ON

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

A. Domestic Special Interest and Quid Pro Quo
"Show me the money" is a title befitting the most recent electoral
cycle, that played out much like a shameless midsummer night's
tragedy. The not-so-glamorous underbelly of political fund-raising in
our nation's capital was revealed publicly in February 1997 when
Harold Ickes, former Deputy Chief of Staff to the President, turned
over approximately 500 pages of fund-raising documents under the
threat of a congressional subpoena' 2 These documents offered
startling revelations of abuses and excesses in fund-raising at the
uppermost echelons of the federal government.
In one particular document, a 1995 memorandum to the White
House, DNC staff suggested a list of fund-raising events that would
enable the DNC to reach its targeted goal of $40 million. 13 The DNC
suggested that the White House host a number of events for
contributors, including: (1) private coffees, (2) sleep-overs in the
Lincoln Bedroom, (3) weekly radio addresses by the President, (4)
White House mess privileges, (5) private dinners and events at the
Kennedy Center with the President, allotting each contributor six to
14
eight seats per event, and (6) rides on Air Force One and Two.
Further, the memo also urged the White House to improve
coordination with the DNC on selection of presidential appointees
to various boards and commissions. 15 These perks were expressly
12. David Tell, The Lincoln Bedroom Caper, THE WEEx y STANDARD (New York), Ma.
10, 1997, at 11.
13. Follow the Money; Ickes: Memo in Files Lists Lavish Perks, THE HOTuNE (American
Political Network, Inc., Alexandria, Va.), Mar. 3, 1997. The Ickes memo was eventually turned
over to members of the House Government Reform and Oversight Committee investigating
allegations of improper fund-raising. Id.
14. John Harris & Ira Chinoy, White House Lists 56 Fund-Raisers,Donors Who Flew
on Air Force One, Tim WAsR. Posr, Apr. 15, 1997, at A6. In 1994, Martha Phipps, a top DNC
staffer, sent a memo to the White House suggesting that seats should be set aside on Air
Force One and Two so that donors could meet with the President and Vice President lIdIn
April 1996, the White House released the names of only 56 fund-raisers that had contributed
over $5,000. Id. Paul Bedard, Big Givers Got Plane Rides With President.- Just
"Appreciation," White House Says, THE WAs. Tm, Apr. 15, 1997, at Al. President Clinton
provided rides to donors and fund-raisers on at least 300 of the 490 Air Force One flights
during 1996. Id,
15. Follow the Money, supra note 13. Between 1992 and 1996, a total of 938 individuals
were invited to stay over in the Lincoln Bedroom of the White House, generating nearly $8
million in soft money contributions. Nightline: Wealthy Donors' Access to White House (ABC
television broadcast, Feb. 25, 1997). The guest list included, among others: Hollywood film
producer, Stephen Spielberg, who gave the DNC $336,000, and Steven Jobbs, a computer
tycoon, who contributed $100,000. Id. One-hundred private White House coffees generated
\
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designed not only to solicit large donations for the Democratic
National Party, but also to reward generous donors. 6 The
President, Vice President, and DNC officials routinely solicited soft
money contributions of $25,000, $50,000, and $100,000, allegedly in
exchange for presidential perks at taxpayer expense. 17 Reportedly,
some individuals "donated" more than $1 million with the
expectation of getting something in return from the Clinton White
18
House.
Harold Ickes also turned over a memorandum to the
subcommittee he sent to the Clintons and Gores in February 1996,
outlining a very aggressive fund-raising schedule to be conducted in
close concert with the DNC.' 9 This campaign was allegedly
implemented, in part, due to the dissatisfaction expressed by the
DNC's 1994 top donors, many of whom were unhappy with the
perceived lack of "tender loving care" from the White House. 20 This
dissatisfaction was apparently reflected in a decrease in DNC
donations made early in the 1996 election cycle. 21 As a result,
between January and October 1996, the DNC planned to involve the
President in 117 fund-raisers; the Vice President in fifty-four, and
the First Lady in twenty-nine. 22 The DNC expected to raise $50
million, $10.8 million, and $5 million from the respective events. 23
$27 million in soft money donations. Id.
16. Nightline: Weafthy Donors' Access to White House, supra note 15.
17. Id. In response to an internal White House memorandum suggesting the private
coffees, overnight stays, and golf outings with the President, President Clinton responded,
"Yes, pursue all three promptly and get other names at $100,000 or more, $50,000 or more,
ready to start overnight right away." Id. Further, new allegations against Vice President Gore
suggest that he may have knowingly and unlawfully transferred $20,000 in soft money he
raised for his own re-election campaign. Edward Walsh, DNC Memo Noted Use of Hard
Money; Republicans Argue Gore Knew, Acted Improperly, THE Wa' Posr, Sept 11, 1997, at
Al; Donald La nbro, Independent Counsel Next to be Named? THE WASK TIMES, Sept 18,
1997, at A18.
18. A Who's Who of the White House Soap..., THE WASH. Tnms, Oct, 19, 1997, at B2.
Johnny Chung, a large DNC donor and a central figure in the DNC campaign scandal, stated,
"I see the White House like a subway. You have to put in coins to open the gates." Id. See
also Pot* and Coffees, THE WAsI. TIMS, July 20, 1997, at B2.
19. Enda & Rankin, supra note 1, at 1. The February memo from Ickes was preceded
by a November 20, 1995 memo from DNC officials to Ickes that suggested the President and
Vice President were needed to help raise $3.2 million for party television ads. Id
20. Peter Baker & Susan Schmidt, President Had Big Role in Setting Donor Perks;
Records Detail Close Inolvenment uith Fund-Raising,THE WAS. POST, Feb. 26, 1997, at Al.
In a 1994 letter from Carl Spielvogel, a prominent DNC fund-raiser, to Harold Ickes,
Spielvogel wrote, "there are quite a few disaffected heavy givers who feel let down by a lack
of tender loving care since the victory." Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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The DNC's top soft money contributors in 1996 were organized
labor and various individuals and companies with business interests
abroad.24 Unions made the largest contributions to the Democratic
Party, reportedly totaling between $200 and $500 million in 1996.2
In return, the unions presumably hoped to increase the country's
minimum wage, to institute cheaper government-run health care, to
receive protection for pension funds, and to preserve a federal law
requiring contractors on federal projects to pay inflated union
wages.2 6
Corporations also made substantial soft money contributions to
the DNC. For example, the Lippo Group, an Indonesian
conglomerate, and its owners have contributed a total of $875,300
to the DNC since 1991.27 In an alleged quid pro quo28 exchange, the
Lippo Group received key appointments to government-sponsored
foreign trade missions to China and Indonesia where Lippo invests
24. Campaign Finance: More DNC Willingness to Thke any Money, THE HanmE
(American Political Network, Inc., Alexandria, Va), Nov. 22, 1996, at 1.
25. Nicholson, supra note 6, at A17. See also Lisa Leiter, Unions Hope to Cashier the
GOP, THE WASL Tsms, May 6, 1996, at 8. The AFL-CIO alone pledged $35 million to defeat
the incumbent "Republican Freshman," elected to Congress in 1994. ld.
26. Leiter, supra note 25, at 8. The targeted law was the Davis-Bacon Act that requires
contractors performing government construction contracts in excess of $2,000 to pay their
employees the "prevailing [union] wage" plus benefits in the locality, regardless of whether
the employees are unionized. 40 U.S.C. § 276(a),(b) (1931, as amended). The Act
discriminates against both minority and nonunion contractors, and contributes significantly
to inflating the cost of government construction contracts. See AMERICAN Pus. WORKS Ass'N,
HSMRY OP PuBuC WORMs IN
mTH UNrrED STATES 1776-1976 10 (Ellis L Armstrong, ed. 1976);
Comment, Pennsylvania's Prevailing Wage Act: An Appropriate Thrget for ERISA
Preemption, 100 DicK. L REv. 919, 922-23, 925 (1996); Maj. Timothy J. Pendolino, The
Davis-Bacon and Service Contract Acts: Laws Whose ime Has Passed?, 147 ML L R .
218, 250-51 (1995).
27. Alan Miller, DNC Seen as Exploring Foreign Funding in 1991, LA Toms, June 30,
1997, at Al. See also Donald Lambro, Puror Grows Over DNC Finances;Democrats Seek to
Stave Off Inquiries Until 4fter Election, Tm WASH TimS, Oct. 30, 1996, at A13.
28. The term "quid pro quo" is used in law to describe giving one thing of value for
another. BLAcK's LAw DIcroNARY 1248 (6th ed. 1990). Some scholars have attempted to.
distinguish between quid pro quo and other forms of political corruption such as monetary
influence and distortion based on the U.S. Supreme Court's holdings. See, e.g., Thomas
Burke, The Concept of Corruption in Campaign Finance Law, 14 CoNsr. CoMrMNr 127, 131
(1997).
While quid pro quo is more akin to bribery (dollars for explicit political favors), "monetary
influence corruption" is a broader concept in which a candidate's decision is influenced,
either directly or indirectly, by contributions. Id.
"Distortion," although very similar to monetary influence, is political influence by
corporations as a result of the large aggregation of wealth that has no correlation between
the public or corporations' political views. Id. at 134. Nonetheless, the Court has consistently
held that political corruption, regardless of the form it takes, is grounds for legislative
reform. Id. at 132-33.
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billions of dollars in business ventures. 29
Allegations of quid pro quo have also surfaced in connection
with West Publishing Company, an $800 million on-line legal
research business. 3° In 1994, Vance Opperman, who was then the
President of West Publishing Company, learned that the Justice
Department planned to move forward with on-line access to court
decisions. 31 If implemented, the Justice Department's new on-line
program would have cost West Publishing millions of dollars in lost
revenue. 32 After enlisting the support of the President and Vice
President, Opperman successfully dissuaded the Justice Department
from implementing the proposed system.83 Shortly thereafter, in
1995, the Justice Department awarded West a $14.2 million contract
to provide the government with on-line research. 34 Ironically, the
timing of Opperman's success in thwarting the government's on-line
plans directly coincided with soft money contributions he made to
the Democratic party.35 To make detection of his large contributions
more difficult, Opperman cleverly sprinkled $329,000 across ten
state party committees.3s
The Democrats, however, were not the only benefactors of large
soft money donations in 1996. Republicans also received substantial
soft money donations that flowed primarily from corporate donors
seeking to gain greater access to the nation's lawmakersY In fact,
the Republicans established a "Team 100" club to pay special
tribute to individuals and corporate donors who donated at least
29. Viveca Novak & Michael Weiaskopf, The Cheerful Giver A Businessman uwith a
Corner on Publishing Court Documents Was Also a Master of Political Donations, Tham
MAGAzNE, Apr. 21, 1997, at 80.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id,
33. Pork and Coffees, supra note 18, at B2.
34. Novak & Weisskopf, supra note 29, at 80.
35. l

36. Id. There are other apparent signs of quid pro quo in the Opperman case. Id. For
example, the President appointed Opperman, a close personal friend of the Vice President, to

an advisory panel in 1993 that was tasked with reviewing a government report encouraging
copyright protection of West's information. Id. With the support of the administration, West,
who at the time was involved in a $3.4 million merger, eventually received approval by the
Justice Department. Id, This copyright decision by the Justice Department was exactly the

leverage needed to close the merger deal Id, Over the same period, Opperman sponsored a
$250,000
privately
37.
MAGAZINE

fund-raiser for the Vice President, attended White House coffees, and dined
with the Gores. Id.
Ann McBride, Common Cause Releases List of GOP Donors, COMMON CAME
(Washington, D.C.), Feb. 19, 1997.
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$100,000 to the party.3 In 1996, congressional leaders invited
members of "Team 100" to a private meeting at a Palm Beach
resort.3 9
Not surprisingly, tobacco companies accounted for four of the
top ten soft money contributors in 1996. 40 According to media
sources, Phillip Morris and RJR-Nabisco combined, gave nearly $2.6
million in an effort to favorably influence ongoing negotiations with
congressional leaders regarding proposed tobacco regulations. 41 The
gave $615,000 to
Atlantic Richfield Company ("ARCO"),
Republicans and $373,000 to Democrats, allegedly to influence
Reserve,
policy decisions regarding Alaska's Arctic National Wildlife
42
exploration.
oil
conduct
to
ARCO
enable
would
that
B.

US. Foreign Policy for Sale

Allegations that the President sold foreign policy and national
security decisions in exchange for large political donations to the
DNC are even more troubling, however, than the domestic quid pro
quo.43 During 1996, individuals and corporations with special
interests in Asia and Latin America made substantial soft money
contributions to the DNC, presumably with the expectation of
gaining access to the President and convincing him to make
"favorable" foreign policy decisions. 44
One family in particular, the Riadys, reportedly played -a
prominent role in funneling soft money into DNC coffers. 45 Mochtar
Riady and his son, James, longtime friends of the President and
First Lady, and owners of the multi-billion-dollar Lippo Group,
38.

Id.

39. I&
40. Martin Walker, Barring Foreign Campaign Money; a Loophole Waiting to be
Exploited, Thi REcoRD (Bergen County, NJ.), Dec. 30, 1996, at A17.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., Thmothy Maier & Paul Rodriquez, HeU's Breaking Loose, THE WAstH TIMS,
Aug. 11, 1997, at 7; Paul Roberts, Smoking Gun in the Coal Bin, THE WAS TIems, Dec. 30,
1996, at A14; Hearings are Revealing Truth, C JPrrL TWmS, July 29, 1997, at AS; and
Thompson: "These Matters Go to the Basic Integrity of Our Government," TH WAS PosT,
July 9, 1997, at A6.
The Riady's PersistentPursuit of Influence; Perception of
44. Sharon LaFraniere et al.,
DNC Donors Pipeline Into Oval Office Boosted Lippo Group in Indonesia, China, THz
WASH. PoST, May 27, 1997, at Al; The Great White House Firesale, supra note 1, at B2; and
Jeff Nesbit, Campaign-fundingProbe Should Follow Roads to Riady, THE WASH. TIMES, Apr.
25, 1997, at B7.
45. LaFraniere, supra note 44, at Al.
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contributed nearly $1 million in soft money to the DNC. 46 In
exchange, the Riadys are said to have anticipated improvements in
their business and governmental relations with China and
Indonesia, countries in which they had substantial investments. 47
The Riadys allegedly used John Huang, a former Lippo executive,
as their primary White House connection.48 Prior to the 1996
election, President Clinton pressured the DNC to hire Huang as
Vice Chair of the DNC Finance Committee. 49 After Huang
successfully raised nearly $3.4 million in soft money for the DNC,
the President is alleged to have rewarded Huang by appointing him
Deputy Assistant Commerce Department Secretary.6° Huang,
currently under investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
for economic espionage, held top-secret clearance during and after
his employment with the Commerce Department.5' Huang, noted
for his political acumen and fund-raising abilities, was thus
strategically positioned to influence the President's decisions on
United States
immigration and foreign policy affecting
Asian-Americans. 52 Mounting evidence suggests Huang's hand in the
President's decision to terminate the trade embargo against
Vietnam.53 Reports indicate that Huang also affected the President's
decision on immigration policy affecting Asian-Americans.5 In fact,
one day after Huang organized an Asian-American fund-raiser in
March 1996, that generated $1.1 million in soft money, he wrote the
President urging him to change his stance opposing the "sibling
46. Id,
47. Id,
48. Alan Miller & Glenn Bunting, U.S. Post for Huang Called "Priority; Inquiry:
Indonesian Firm Sought Administration Job for Official Now Targeted in Fund-Raising
Probe, Letter States. LA. Tam, Jul. 15, 1997, at A13.
49. Terry Lemons & Jane Fullerton, Clinton Put Word in ForHuang, He Got the Job,
ARKANsAs DEMOCRAT-GAZwrE (Little Rock), JuL 10, 1997, at Al.
50. Miller & Bunting, supra note 48, at A13.
51. Jerry Seeper, Solomon Accuses Huang of "Espionage"; Rules Chairman Makes
Case in Letter to Feeh, THE WASH. Tham, June 13, 1997, at Al; White House Quid Pro Quo,
THE WASHL Tess, Feb. 23, 1997. at B2; 1imothy Maier, Why Red China Targeted the Clinton
White House, THE WASL TMES, May 26, 1997, at 8. Mr. Huang was employed at the
Department of Commerce for 18 months, but retained his top-secret clearance for 36 months.
The Great White House Firesale,supra note 1, at B2.
52. Doug Tsuruoka, Asia Has Long Tried to Sway U.S. Policy, ASIA TIMES, Mar. 6, 1997,
at 7; Paul Roberts, Clinton's Pen Aids Foreign Priends,RocKY MouNTA NEws (Denver), Jan.
4, 1997, at A40; Andrew Rosenthal, China's Connecting Line, THE CHATrANOOGA TIhES, July
23, 1997, at A6; The Great White House Firesale, supra note 1, at B2.
53. Paul Craig Roberts, Smoking Gun in the Coal Bin, THE WASI. ThMa, Dec. 30, 1996,
at A14.
54. The Great White House Firesale,supra note 1, at B2.
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an immigration policy giving special immigration
preference" treatment to foreign-born brothers and sisters of naturalized
citizens.5 Within several weeks, the President publicly reversed his
position and halted any effort to ban sibling preference.5
Reports also suggest that Huang influenced the signing of a 1996
Presidential executive order preserving 1.7 million acres of land in
southwest Utah, known as the Grand Staircase Escalante National
Monument 57 This decision halted plans by United States mining
companies to extract valuable clean-burning coal.5 Reportedly, the
Executive Order boosted the Indonesian economy and indirectly
helped the massive Indonesian Lippo conglomerate.5 Some sources
suggest that the Executive Order, although touted as
"environmental protection," was actually disguised payment to the
Riadys for their donations to the DNC.6°
Other controversial political donors spotlighted by the media for
contributing soft money to the DNC include: Johnny Chung,
"Charlie" Yah Lin Trie, Pauline Kanchanalak, Roger Tanraz, and
Mark Jimenez. Each made substantial donations apparently
motivated by a desire for quid pro quo, but achieved varying
6
degrees of success. '
Chung, a Chinese-American, was a major contributor and DNC
fund-raiser in 1996. 62 He visited the White House more than fifty
times during the 1996 election cycle and raised nearly $391,000 in
soft money for the DNC. 63 Chung played a key role in introducing
Chinese executives of the China Ocean Shipping Company
("Cosco") to President Clinton." For several years, Cosco sought
55. Id.
56.
57.

Id.
Roberts, supra note 53, at A14.

58. Id,
59. Id,
60. Id. According to Sarah Foster, the journalist who first broke the story, 'with a
stroke of his pen [President Clinton] wiped out the only significant competition to
Indonesian coal interests in the world market" Id.
61. The Great White House FiMrsae, supra note 1, at B2; Frm the Database, A
(American Political Network, Inc.,
Six-Month Index of "Follow the Money," THE Harrnu
Alexandria, Va.), Apr. 18, 1997; and DemocraticParty Pund-RaisingControversy, Ex-convict
Met With Clinton, Other Deveopments, FAcrs ON Fnz WORLD NEWS DIGEr, Feb. 13, 1997, at

85VA3.
62. The Great White House FiMrsale, supra note 1, at B2; Cal Thomas, The White
House of /11 Repute, THE BunrAL NEws, July 30, 1997, at B3.
63. The Great White House Firesale,supra note 1, at B2.
64. See Janice Church, Shuttered Long Beach Naval Station Opens Door to
SCIENCE MONrroN, Mar. 28, 1997, at 3; Rowan Scarborough,
Controversial Client, CHRumsr
Cosoo's Ship Deal in U.S. Gets Scrutiny, THE WAS1t TImS, Apr. 1, 1997, at Al; Rowan
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federal and local approval to construct a $200 million cargo
terminal on the West Coast.6 In early 1995, the White House invited
a top Cosco advisor, Hongye Zheng, who was among a delegation
of Chinese businessmen, to watch the President make a weekly
radio address.6 6 According to media reports, just two days prior to
this meeting, Chung visited the White House to present the First
Lady's Chief of Staff, Maggie Williams, with a check for $50,000
payable to the DNC.67 Several days prior to this donation, Chung
received a $150,000 wire transfer from a Chinese bank.6 8 Following
Chung's sizable contributions to the DNC, and the President's
alleged intercession, Cosco received final approval from the Harbor
Commission of Long Beach, California, as well as President
Clinton, to lease the Long Beach Naval Station and construct a
69
terminal.
Charlie Trie, a restauranteur from Little Rock, Arkansas, gave
nearly $645,000 to the DNC in the 1996 election. 70 Reportedly, Trie
delivered an additional $640,000 to the President's legal defense
fund.71 Trie was subsequently appointed by the President to the
Scarborough, Corps Lost Site in Cosco Deal,. Reserve Unit in Long Beach was Evicted, THE
WAs TIam, Mar. 24, 1997, at Al; and Ken Hamblin, China's Foothold in Calfornia, THm
DENvER PoSr, Mar. 16, 1997, at D3.
65. Scarborough, supra note 64, at D3.
66. 7fmothy Maier, Long March Reaches Long Beach, THE WAm Th s, Sept. 8, 1997, at
18; China'sAttempt to Lease Naval Shipyard Questioned, THE BuurnN's F ONTRuNNm, Mar.
12, 1997.
67. Mary Ann Akers, Two Democratic Donors Got Asian Money; Bank Moves, Gifts
Coincided, Tim WASt ThMaS, July 11, 1997, at Al; William Rempel & Alan Miller, Donor
Disputes: White House Insists Aides to First Lady Sought Money, LA T m, July 28, 1997,
at A6. Chung, who at the time was seeking VIP treatment for a group of Chinese
businessmen, claimed that he was pressured by White House aides to help pay for the costs
of a White House Chrstmas reception that had been billed to the DNC. Ld.William Rempel
& Alan Miller, Donor Speaks Out on Clinton Group; fund-Raising: Private Committee Did
Favors,Had White House 7es, Chung's Lawyer Says, LA TIS, Aug. 9, 1997, at Al; Donor
Disputes, at A6. The White House, however, denied Chung's allegations. Id.
68. Akers, supra note 67, at Al. It was also revealed that Yogesh Ghandhi, an
Indian-American businessman from California, received a $500,000 wire transfer from a
Japanese Bank after Ghandi made a $325,000 donation to the DNC. Id.
69. Jeff Leede, Harbor Panel OKs Terminal for Chinese Line, LA Thns, Mar. 25,
1997, at Al; Clinton Helped Chinese Get Base, NEWSDAY, Mar. 9, 1997 at A8. It has since been
revealed that the President attended at least two meetings with Long Beach and Pentagon
officials to push for the Cosco deal. Clinton Helped Chinese, supra. High level members of
the administration reportedly made several unusual telephone calls to key officials on
Cosco's behalf. "Highly Unusual" Calls by NEC Official Benefitted Cosco, THE BuuriN's
FRONTUNNER, May 9, 1997.
70. Deroy Murdock, GOP Donor Woes Hardly Match DemocraticPund-RaisingFiasco,
Tim WAsh. Tas, Apr. 21, 1997, at 29; The Great White House Firesale,supra note 1, at B2.
71. The Great White House Firesale, supra note 1, at B2.
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President's Commission on U.S.-Pacific Trade and Investment and
frequently visited the White House, escorting various individuals
with Chinese investments and business ties to private meetings
with the President. 2 In February of 1996, Trie brought Wang Jun, a
reputed arms dealer and former officer in the Chinese People's
Liberation Army, and Ernest Green, a businessman from Little
Rock, Arkansas, to a private coffee with the President 73 The day
after the meeting, Green, who sought to develop a business
relationship with Jun's Chinese corporation, donated $50,000 to the
DNC. 74 During this same period, Trie vigorously lobbied the
President to reconsider deploying American troops to monitor the
dispute between China and Taiwan.75
Pauline Kanchanalak, a Thai businesswoman, donated a total of
$250,000 to the DNC in 1996, allegedly to urge the President to host
the inaugural session of the U.S.-Thai Business Council at the
White House.7 6 On one occasion, Kanchanalak donated $85,000 to
the DNC on the same day that she attended a White House coffee. 7
Reports indicate that Tanmraz, a Lebanese-American and President
of the New York-based Oil Capital, Ltd., sought support from the
White House for his plan to construct a multibillion dollar oil
pipeline in the Caspian Sea region. 7 On numerous occasions, the
National Security Council ("NSC") advised the White House that
because Tamraz was an international fugitive, he should be refused
access. 79 Nevertheless, Tamraz reportedly met with, and received
considerable support from, President Clinton.80
According to sources, after meeting with Tamraz on March 27,
1996, the President asked Mac McLarty, former White House Chief
of Staff, to look into the matter."' McLarty subsequently contacted
Jack Carter, a high-ranking Energy Department official and former
fund-raiser for Clinton and Texas Democrats, to generate support
72. Id,
73.
74.

Id.
Id.

75. Id.
76. The Great White House Firesale,supra note 1, at B2.
POsT, Apr. 6, 1997, at
77. Anne Farris, Unfolding Story Swelis Like a Sponge, THs WA
A16; The Collapsing Coffee Defense, THE WAS. 7)3ms, Mar. 10, 1997, at B2.

78. 7mraz Case Seen as Quid Pro Quo, THE Buuzmi's FRONTRUNNER (Bulletin
Broadfaxing Network Inc., McLean, V&), June 6, 1997, at 1; Edward Pound, Clinton Met
With FinancierAbout Oil Pipeline Project, USA TODAY, June 4, 1997, at 10A.
79. Clinton Met With Financier, supra note 78, at 10A. Tamnaz was wanted by
Lebanese authorities on a $160 million bank embezzlement charge. Id

80. Id
81.

Id.
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for Tamraz's project.8 Carter, in return, contacted Sheila Heslin at
the NSC. s3 According to Heslin, Carter told her that Tanraz had
given $200,000 to the DNC and would give an additional $200,000 if
the Administration supported Tamraz's pipeline project.s4 Donald
Fowler, then DNC Chairman, also allegedly pressured the NSC to
sanction Tamraz's access to the White House. s5 Fowler has refused
comment on the matter.8 6
On June 14, 1997, Tamraz was arrested in the Georgian capital,
Thlisi, on an outstanding Interpol arrest warranty' Soon thereafter,
however, he was released, returning voluntarily to the United
States.8s Although the Lebanese government asked for cooperation
in extraditing Tamraz, the United States refused to arrest Tamraz
on the grounds that it had no extradition treaty with Lebanon. 89
The grand jury continues its probe into links between Tamraz and
the White House 0
Mark Jimenez, an executive with a Florida-based computer
company, has poured more than $800,000 in soft money into DNC
coffers since 1993. 91 Jimenez, who also has substantial investments
in Paraguay, met with the President and NSC staff members several
times in 1996 to discuss the effect of Paraguay's political instability
on his business ventures.2 In March 1996, Jimenez escorted one of
the Paraguayan President's top advisors to the White House for a
private coffee.9 Ten days after their visit, Jimenez donated $50,000
to the DNC. 94 One month later, President Clinton lifted economic
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Clinton Met With Financier, supra note 78, at 10A; Edward Walsh, Tamraz
Defends Political Donations,Access to 7bp Officals Was "Only Reason," Pipeline Promoter
7bstifies, THE WAsL POST, Sept. 19, 1997, at Al. When asked by Senator Lieberman during
congressional hearings on the matter whether he believed he got his money's worth, Tamraz
replied "I think next time I'll give $600,000." Id.
85. Grand Jury Probes DNC Donor Tamraz, FAcTs ON F=z WORLD Nws DGfST, July
17, 1997, at Al.

86. Id.
87. Michael Lelyveld, Oil FinancierArrested, Released in Georgian Capital Grand
Jury Probing White House Links, J. OF ComRcE, June 17, 1997, at AS.

88. Id.
89.

Alleged Accomplice of U.S. Lebanese 71jcoon Arrested in Lebanon, AGENCE FRANCE

PRESSE, July 19, 1997.
90. Grand Jury Probe DNC Donor Tamraz, supra note 85, at Al.
91. The Great White House Firesale,supra note 1, at B2.
92. Id.
93. Id.

94. Id.
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sanctions against Paraguay imposed for cocaine smuggling.9
Additionally, in April 1996, Jimenez warned the White House of a
possible Paraguayan coup.9 Coincidentally, on the same day as the
coup, Jimenez donated $100,000 to the DNC. 7
Except for Charlie Trie, no charges have been brought against
any of these individuals for violating campaign finance laws. 98
Nonetheless, these examples present strong circumstantial evidence
of quid pro quo and attempts by political donors to purchase and
influence American foreign policy decisions. Mounting evidence
strongly suggests that certain donors received the benefit of their
bargains.
C.

PresidentialAppointments and DNC Contributions

Recent developments also raise suspicions of a link between
large
soft money contributions
and recent presidential
appointments to key governmental advisory committees. 99 For
example, the President recently appointed Stanley Shuman and
Richard Bloch, two DNC contributors and fund-raisers, to serve on
the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. 1°° Neither
Shuman nor Bloch possesses any foreign-policy or intelligence
experience; however, both have made large donations to the DNC.
Shuman gave $42,000 in soft money during the 1993-1994 electoral
cycle and $105,000 during the 1996 campaign.10 ' Bloch donated
$115,000 to the DNC in 1996.102
Jake Steinfeld, a health fitness business owner and television
95. Id.
96. The Great White House Firesale, supra note 1, at B2.
97. Id.
98. David Johnston, Charlie Trie, Clinton Fund-Raiser,Is Arrested in Capitol, N.Y.
TnEs SE cVE,February 5, 1998. Charlie Trie was arrested on February 5, 1998, after being
indicted on fifteen counts of obstructing justice and funneling illegal contributions to the
DNC. Id. He is the first defendant to be charged with FECA crimes stemming from the 1996
campaign finance scandal. Id.
99. Alan Miller, Leading Clinton Donors Got Lifts on Air Force One, LA. T3S, Apr.
15, 1997, at Al; Big Fund-RaisersAlso Were Required to be Consideredfor Administration
Posts, Documents Show, LA TiMEs, Apr. 15, 1997, at Al. Examples of other key
appointments of top DNC donors include: Arthur Levitt (Chairman of the SEC), Erskine
Bowles (Administrator of the Small Business Administration and White House Chief of Staff),
Alan Blinken (Ambassador to Belgium), Donald Blinken (Ambassador to Hungary), Clay
Constantinou (Ambassador to Luxembourg), and Thomas Siebert (Ambassador to Sweden).
Id.
100. The Great White House Firesale,supra note 1, at B2; Bill Gertz, Lake Cant Recall
How Donors Got on Spy Panel, THE WAs. TImES, Mar. 13, 1997, at A3.
101. Miller, supra note 99, at Al; Big Fund-Raisers, supra note 99, at Al.
102. Big Fund-Raisers,supra note 99, at Al.
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personality, was appointed to the President's Council on Physical
Fitness and Athletics. 103 This appointment has also generated
considerable controversy. 1°4 Steinfeld wrote four checks of $25,000
each to the DNC in mid-1996.'16 Steinfeld had never been a major
contributor to the DNC in the past; records indicate his only prior
6
donation was $500 to a congressional candidate in 1987Y
According to reports, to make room for Steinfeld on the
twenty-member council, the President requested the resignation of
Florence Griffith Joyner, who, although a very popular public
figure, had never contributed to the DNC.Y°7
D.

CoordinationBetween National Parties and Their Candidates

The 1996 election also revealed the degree to which candidates
and their national parties are interdependent 10 Over the last
several years, the Clintons have developed a $1.7 million computer
database, affectionately referred to by Democratic insiders as "Big
Brother.""09 Big Brother contains the names of 350,000 donors and
their respective donation histories." 0 In addition, sources report
that Big Brother contains a list of special perks that each donor
desires."' Truman Arnold, former DNC Finance Chairman, publicly
admitted using the database to ensure that major party donors
2
received special favors from the White House."
The White House maintains that the database is used solely for
103. Charles Babcock, Bodybuilder, DNC Donor May Head Ftness Council; Cable TV
Athlete Contributed $100,000, THE WASH Posr, Mar. 1, 1997, at A10.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Transcript of White House press briefing by Mike McCurry, U.S. NEwSwmE (June
27, 1997).
108. Peter Grier, Clinton Teeters on Legal Edge of FinanceLaw, THE CHRISMrN SCIENCE
MoznR, Feb. 27, 1997, at 1. According to Henry Graff, presidential historian and professor
at Columbia University, "it is a curious notion that you can separate the actions of the
president as president from the actions of the president as politician.... The line between
national party committees and the White House has always been an invisible Chinese wal."
Id,
109. Paul Rodriquez, Big Brother's New Lies, Secrets and Misdemeanors, THE WASH
ThmES, Apr. 7, 1997, at Al.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Pork and Coffees, supra note 18, at B2; Susan Schmidt, Hubbell Vows No More
Cooperation,Freed Ex-Justice Official Says He Has Offered Enough to Investigators, THE
WAsh POSr, Feb. 13, 1997, at A14. Reportedly, Truman also gave "hush money" to the
embattled Clinton friend and former top Justice Department Official, Webster Hubbell, who
was recently indicted for embezzlement stemming from his prior activities at the Rose Law
Firm where the First Lady was also a partner. Id.
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official business, not campaign activities.11 3 Yet, records indicate
that the DNC and the White House worked closely together to
14
develop the database specifically to track fund-raising efforts.
Media reports indicate that the First Lady and the DNC held
weekly meetings to monitor the status of the system." 5
Additionally, the DNC is reported to have actually paid individuals
- whom the White House calls "volunteers" - to work with the
6
President and his top aides to update and manage Big Brother."
One of the President's closest political consultants, Dick Morris,
recently claimed that the President not only solicited and
channeled soft money to the DNC during the 1996 election, but
7
also directly controlled DNC expenditures for issue advertising."
According to Morris, the President was not merely a passive
bystander, he edited, reviewed, and ordered changes to scripts,
8
ultimately deciding whether certain ads would be aired."
E.

Money-Laundeing Schemes

The proliferation of soft money has also spawned accusations of
pervasive and elaborate money-laundering schemes." 9 One notable
example involved Arief Wriadinata, an Indonesian national, who
lived and worked in Virginia as a gardener until late 1 9 9 6 .120 After
the 1996 election, sources revealed that Wiriadinata, despite his
modest means, had contributed $425,000 to the DNC in 1996.121
Further media and congressional investigations suggest that
113. Jamie Dettner, Cautious Confessions of a Cynical Optimist, THE WASH. TwMEs,
Mar. 31, 1997, at 48. When asked by a journalist whether she had ordered the computer
database, Hillary Clinton stated, "I would doubt that I was the person who ordered it." The
official White House position has been that the database was created only to maintain the
White House Christmas card list Id.
114. Paul Bedard, Hillary Eyed Databasefor DNC, THE WAS TinEs, Mar. 4, 1997, at
Al.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Philip Galley, A Question of Accountability, ST. PmSBuRG (FL) ThiMS, Apr. 13,
1997, at D3.
118. Id.
119. Susan Schmidt & Lena Sun, On Thpe, Clinton Links Lead in PoUs, Issue Ads, THE
WAsH. Posr, Oct 6, 1997, at Al. Since the 1996 election, the DNC has been forced to return
approximately $5 million in suspected illegal contributions. Donald Lambro, DNC Says
Scandals Don't Hurt Contributions,THE WASL TIES, Oct 15, 1997,. at A10.
120. White House Delivers 60 Coffee Tapes; Promises to Turn Over More bday, THE
WASH. TwMEs, Oct. 15, 1997, at A4; Mr. Pesident ...
This is Your Campaign, TH WAS

POST, Oct 8, 1997, at A21. Wiriadinata fled the United States in late 1996 after his
involvement in the scandal was disclosed. Id.
121.

White House Delivers, supra note 120, at A4.
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Wiriadinata was used as a "straw donor"2 by Dr. Hashem Neem, a
former Lippo Group executive. 23
Another money-laundering scandal implicated Vice President Al
Gore.1 24
' In early 1996, Gore attended a function at the Hsi Lai
Temple, a Buddhist monastery in southern California, for what was
characterized by the White House as a "community outreach"
event.'25 The event generated nearly $166,500 in soft money for the
DNC. 126 Congressional investigations later revealed that many of the
Temple's nuns and priests had been pressured into making straw
donations totaling $60,000, later reimbursed from Temple funds. 127
A congressional committee also inquired into allegations
of an
elaborate money-laundering scheme involving members of the DNC,
the White House, and the Teamsters Union.l2s According to Martin
Davis, a close campaign adviser to Teamsters' President Ron Carey,
top-ranldng officials of the Clinton-Gore campaign proposed that
the Teamsters contribute $1 million to various state Democratic
parties.' 29 In exchange, the DNC reportedly planned to give
122. A "straw donor" is a sham contributor who illegally donates money provided by
another under his own name to a political campaign in order to mask the identity of the real
contributor. Michael J. Sniffen, Indictments Looming in Funds Probe, Asso.AnTED PRESS, NOV.
19, 1997. Straw donors are used to circumvent statutory limits on the amount an individual
or corporation can legally contribute to a candidate or conceal the fact that the real donor is
a foreign national or corporation, prohibited by law from maldng a contribution to an
American political campaign. Id.
123. Mr. President, supra note 120, at A21. The House Committee on Government
Reform and Oversight also investigated other straw donors who gave thousands of dollars in
illegal donations to the DNC. Id. Among those formally questioned by the committee include
Manlin Foung, sister of Charlie Trie, Joseph Landon, a friend of Trie, and David Wang, an
associate of John Huang. Id.
124. Al GoreOs Pathetic Way With the Truth, THE WAsit TVMEs, Sept 4, 1997, at A20.
125. Greg Pierce, THE WAs. TamS, Oct 13, 1997, at A6; Al Gore's Pathetic Way, supra
note 124, at A20. Until recently, the Vice President denied having any knowledge that the
event had been used as a fund-raiser Id. However, documents turned over to congressional
investigators revealed that an aide provided Gore with an itinerary before the event that
stated, "DNC Luncheon in LA/Hacienda Heights: 1000-5000 head." Id.
126. Pat Griffith, Nuns Testify Over Funds; Donors Reimbursed, Papers Destroyed,
But Gore, DNC not Involved, They Say, PrrrsBauGH PoSr-GAzumrE, Sept 5, 1997, at A12. John
Huang coordinated the event with Maria Hsia, a Democratic fund-raiser and close adviser to
the Temple. Id.
127. Id.
128. Morton Kondracke, Forget White House Calls, Real Scandal Involves the Unions,
ROLL CAL (Washington, D.C.), Sept 25, 1997.
129. The Travels of Martin Davis, THE WA S. TmEs, Oct. 13, 1997, at A18. Reportedly,
Ron Carey needed money to aid in his reelection bid against James P Hoffa, a very popular
and formidable opponent Id. The Clinton Administration, seeldng to repair strained relations
with Carey and the Teamsters Union, threw its support to Carey, using the DNC as the
conduit for the money-swap. Id.
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$100,000 directly to Carey's beleaguered reelection campaign."
The illegal plan reportedly began in June 1996 when Davis
approached Terence McAuliffe, chief fund-raiser for the
Clinton-Gore campaign, with the money-swap idea. 13 1 Several weeks
after this meeting, Davis met with Richard Sullivan, then Finance
Director for the DNC, and other Clinton-Gore officials to lay out
the specifics of the deal. 132 The parties reportedly agreed to use
Judith Vazquez, a Philippine businesswoman, to funnel $100,000 to
Carey during a fund-raising dinner.- 3 This plan was abandoned,
however, when Sullivan learned that Vazquez was a foreign
national. 3 4 Sullivan, presumably wary that a foreign donor might
attract suspicion regarding the transaction's legality, subsequently
ordered the money redirected to Carey's front-group, Teamsters'
Corruption-Free Union. 35
I.

BACKGROUND TO FEDERAL ELECTION LAW

Corruption is no stranger to American politics. Large donations
to Richard Nixon's presidential campaign and general concerns
about political corruption prompted Congress to pass the Federal
Election Campaign Act ("FECA") in 1971.136 Congress enacted FECA
to regulate the flow of money into federal campaigns in an effort to
130. Id.
131. Id. Others believed to be involved in the scheme include Laura Hartigan, deputy
fund-raiser for Clinton-Gore '96; Mark Thomann, a DNC fund-raiser, and Harold Ickes. Id.
This story came to light through the sworn testimony of Mark Thomann during Senate
hearings- Id. Reportedly, Thomann was used by the DNC as the primary middleman for the
money-swap. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. The Travels, supra note 129, at A18.
135. Id Reportedly, Carey became increasingly impatient with the DNC's inability to
deliver the $100,000 and had his attorney repeatedly contact DNC officials. Id, Davis
eventually terminated the deal when the DNC was unable to successfully divert the money to
his-campaign. Id. While Carey never received the promised money, the Democratic party
received approximately $276,000 from the deal. Id. Davis and three other Teamster officials
were subsequently indicted on unrelated fraud and money-laundering charges. Id,
136. Proposed Amendments to Federal Campaign Laws: Hearings Before the House
Oversight Committee, 103rd Cong (1995) (statement of Michael Malbin, Professor, University
at Albany (*SUNY"), and Director, Center for Legislative Studies, Rockefeller Institute of
Government). In Nixon's 1972 reelection bid, more than 30 corporate donors contributed
over $100,000 each after being reportedly subjected to strong-arm tactics by Nixon's
fund-raisers. Id, Additionally, one notable contribution of $2.1 million from a Chicago
businessman to Nixon's reelection committee generated considerable momentum toward
campaign finance reform. Mike Eberts, The Truth About PACs is Their Help Outweighs
Their Harm, THE SAN DiEo UmoN-TRIBuNE, June 3, 1984, at C4.
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discourage corruption. 37 FECA, however, provides limits only on
direct candidate contributions, 1" requiring candidates to disclose all
contribution-related receipts. 139 FECA limits monetary
contributions' 4° from various sources including individuals,
corporations, political action committees, and unions. 141 FECA
places an aggregate limit of $25,000 per calendar year per
individual donor on total political contributions made directly to
candidates.' 42 An individual is limited to a maximum direct
donation of $1,000 to any one candidate.' 43 FECA does permit an
individual to donate up to $20,000 each year to a national political
committee for independent party expenditures that benefit a
particular candidate.' 44 However, FECA outlaws direct corporate
and union contributions to candidates, but permits soft money
"4
contributions or hard money donations via registered PACs.1
137. Federal Election Commission, The FEC and the Federal Campaign Finance Law
File (last modified August 1, 1997) <httpJ/www.fec.gov/pagesfecfecahtm>; Campaign
FinanceReform, 1997: Hearingson S. 25, supra note 7.
138. 2 U.S.C. § 441a (1996).
139. 2 U.S.C. § 434 (1996). A candidate's principal campaign committee must file
regular reports of receipts and disbursements with the Federal Election Commission
CFEC"). Id
140. Under FECA, the term "contribution" means:
(i) any gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money or anything of value
made by any person for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office; or
(ii) the payment by any person of compensation for the personal services of another
person which are rendered to a political committee without charge for any purpose.
2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(B) (1996).
141. Campaign FinanceReform, 1997: Hearings on S. 25, supra note 7.
142. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(3) (1996).
143. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(A) (1996). See also Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign
Comm'n. v. FEC, 116 S. Ct 2309 (1996).
144. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(B) (1996).
145. FECA provides, in relevant part
[I]t is unlawful for any national bank, or any corporation organized by authority of
any law of Congress, to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with any
election to any political office, or in connection with any primary election or political
convention or caucus held to select candidates for any political office, or for any
corporation whatever, or any labor organization, to make a contribution or
expenditure in connection with any election at which presidential and vice
presidential electors or a Senator or Representative in, or a Delegate or Resident
Commissioner to, Congress are to be -voted for, or in connection with any primary
election or political convention or caucus held to select candidates for any of the
foregoing offices, or for any candidate, political committee, or other person knowingly
to accept or receive any contribution prohibited by this section, or any officer or any
director of any corporation or any national bank or any officer of any labor
organization to consent to any contribution or expenditure by the corporation,
national bank, or labor organization, as the case may be, prohibited by this section.
2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (1996).
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Importantly, FECA regulates only direct contributions to
candidates.'4
FECA's limits do not apply to soft money
contributions given to national, state, and local political committees
for general party-building use, or to expenditures by political
parties that only indirectly support candidates. 147 Such loopholes
allow, and actually encourage, political donors to circumvent
federal law and funnel millions of dollars to a particular candidate
via that candidate's political party. Campaign contributions travel
the path of least resistance and as a result have gravitated toward
unregulated soft money.
Given this loophole, in recent years candidates and political
parties have developed creative fund-raising and campaigning

techniques that avoid FECAs strictures. 148 "Issue advertising," in
particular, has gained tremendous popularity among candidates."4
Issue ads present candidates with a unique opportunity to express
their political views on television, without directly declaring that
they are seeking political office. 1 ° As long as the advertisement
does not expressly endorse the election or defeat of a particular
candidate, the cost of the ad is not counted against FECA's
expenditure or contribution limits.151 A substantial portion of soft
money raised by both the DNC and RNC in 1996 was spent on
15 2
issue advertising.
146. Section 441a of FECA states, in relevant part
[Flor purposes of the limitations imposed by this section, all contributions made by a
person, either directly or indirectly, on behalf of a particular candidate, including
contributions which are in any way earmarked or otherwise directed through an
intermediary or conduit to such candidate, shall be treated as contributions from such
person to such candidate.
2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(8) (1996).
147. Campaign Finance Reform, 1997: Hearings on S. 25, supra note 7.
148. David Mason, Wishful Soft-Money Posturing, THE WAm TmEs, June 12, 1997, at
A18.
149. Ld.
150. Id. In 1996, The RNC ran several issue ads featuring then presidential candidate
Bob Dole. Campaign Finance Reform, supm note 7. When asked whether the ads violated
FECA, Mr. Dole responded, "[i]t never says that rm running for President, though I hope
that's fairly obvious, since rm the only one in the pictures." Id.
151. Mason, supra note 148, at A18.
152. Id. See also Marty Meehan, So Long, Soft Money, THE NEw DEMOCRAT, May-June
1997, at 18; Matt Pottinger, Campaign Reform May Hurt Ad Spending: Cable TV Ads,
MUTicHANNEL NEws, Mar. 17, 1997, No. 11, Vol. 18, at 108. Although reported figures vary, the
DNC and RNC combined are estimated to have spent between $17 and $80 million on issue
ads in 1996. See Meehan, supra; Pottinger, supra. This figure does not include undisclosed
non-profit soft money expenditures. Id.
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Supreme Court Decisions Involving Federal Campaign Laws
In 1976, the Supreme Court of the United States struck down
numerous provisions of FECA in Buckley v. Valeo.1 53 In particular,
the Court held that FECA's limit on expenditures by candidates for
their own campaigns violated the First Amendment. The Court
clearly distinguished political "contributions" from "expenditures,"
concluding that expenditures constituted a higher form of political
speech, and therefore, deserved greater protection. 1' 4
In striking down expenditure limits, the Buckley Court concluded
that a direct correlation exists between the amount of a candidate's
expenditures and the quantity and quality of political speech. 55
Importantly, the Court recognized that television advertising,
although quite expensive, provides the most effective mode of
communication for political expression.'5 The Court opined that
spending limits severely curtail candidates' abilities to purchase
15 7
television time to broadcast their message.
Contributions, on the other hand, are deemed to be merely
symbolic expressions, whose size bears little relationship to free
speech.158 The Buckley Court upheld FECA's limitations on
contributions on two basic grounds: prevention of actual
corruption and prevention of the appearance of corruption.1 9 The
Court stressed the importance of maintaining the integrity of the
electoral process, and the public's confidence therein, by
minimizing the negative influence of special interest and hard
153. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
154. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20-22.
155. Id, at 19.
156. Id,
157. Id. The Court stated, "although the Act's limitations on expenditures by campaign
organizations and political parties provide substantially greater room for discussion and
debate, they would have required restrictions in the scope of a number of past congressional
and Presidential campaigns and would operate to constrain campaigning by candidates who
raise sums in excess of the spending ceiling." Id.
158. Id.. at 21. The Court offered the following reasoning:
[T]he quantity of communication by the contributor does not increase perceptibly with
the size of his contribution, since the expression rests solely on the undifferentiated,

symbolic act of contributing. At most, the size of the contribution provides a very
rough index of the intensity of the contributors support for the candidate. A limitation
on the amount of money a person may give to a candidate or campaign organization
thus involves little direct restraint on his political communication, for it permits the
symbolic expression of support evidenced by a contribution but does not in any way
infringe the contributor's freedom to discuss candidates and issues.
Id.
159. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26.
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money donations. 16° The Court clearly recognized that a candidate's
objective decision-making abilities can easily be tainted by donors
expecting quid pro quo for large contributions. 16 1 The Court,
cognizant of the social and legal complexities of this issue, further
concluded that bribery laws are utterly ineffective against quid pro
1
quo. 6
The Court held that FECA's restrictions on contributions are
constitutional and do not materially undermine the protection
afforded to political discourse. 6, In fact, the Court recently
suggested that FECAs contribution limits may actually enhance
political discourse by forcing candidates and parties to pool
resources
from many small contributors.'6
By capping
contributions, candidates must attract more individual donors who,
by virtue of their decision to donate, become active participants in
the political process.'6
The Buckley Court also struck down FECAs provisions limiting
"independent" campaign contributions or expenditures made
without coordination between the donor and the candidate.'6 The
160. Id
161. Id. The Court stated.
To the extent that large contributions are given to secure political quid pro quo from
current and potential office holders, the integrity of our system of representative
government is undermined... Of almost equal concern as the danger of actual quid
pro quo arrangements is the impact of the appearance of corruption stemming from
public awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large
individual financial contributions.
IdL
162. Id, at 27-28. In rejecting the argument that bribery laws were sufficient to deter
quid pro quo arrangements, the Court stated, "laws making criminal the giving and taking of
bribes deal with only the most blatant and specific attempts of those with money to
influence governmental action." Id.
163. 1l, 424 U.S. at 29.
164. See Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm'n. v. FEC, 59 E3d 1015 (10th Cir.
1995), 7ev'd, 116 S. Ct. 2309 (1996).
165. Id, (quoting S. Rep. No. 93-689, at 7 (1974)). "[A] vigorous party system .is vital to
American politics ...
Pooling resources from many small contributors is a legitimate
function and an integral part of party politics" Id.
166. BuckeyJ, 424 U.S. at 45. According to the Court, "independent advocacy... does
not presently appear to pose dangers of real or apparent corruption comparable to those
identified with large campaign contributions." Id. The Court added.
Unlike contributions, such independent expenditures may well provide little assistance
to the candidate's campaign and indeed may prove counterproductive. The absence of
prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with the candidate or his agent
not only undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate, but also alleviates
the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper
commitments from the candidate.
L at 47.
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Court concluded that independent monetary support does not
create the same corruption potential as coordinated contributions,
even though quid pro quo can be more easily arranged within this
setting. 167 The Court concluded that limits can only be applied to

independent expenditures or contributions that "in express terms
advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate for
federal office." 16 The Court cited the following examples of express
advocacy: "vote for," "elect," "support," "cast your ballot for,"
"Smith for Congress," "vote against," "defeat," and "reject."1 6
Anything short of express advocacy, according to the Court, is
protected free speech, and therefore, not subject to FECA's limits.1 70
In a 1996 case, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit favoring FECA and limiting
the independent expenditures17 1 of a state political committee. 172
The Colorado Republican Committee ("CRC") purchased radio
advertising in early 1986 attacking the Democrats' then-likely
senatorial candidate, Timothy Wirth. 73 The Federal Election
Commission ("FEC") brought suit against the CRC, alleging that the
advertising costs exceeded FECA limitations on expenditures
"made in connection with" a campaign. 74 The FEC argued that
state committee expenditures were de facto coordinated, because a
party and its candidate were one and the same.1 75
The Court concluded that genuine uncoordinated independent
expenditures constitute core First Amendment expressions that are
not subject, under any circumstances, to federal regulation.1 76
Adhering to the corruption standard first pronounced in Buckley,
the Court reasoned that the opportunity for corruption posed by
unregulated soft money contributions is minimal or nonexistent 1 7
167. Id. at 45-48.
168. Id at 44.
169. Id. at 44 n52.
170. Id at 45.
171. FECA defines an "independent expenditure" as "an expenditure by a person
expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate that is made
without cooperation or consultation with any candidate, or any authorized committee or
agent of such candidate, and which is not made in concert with, or at the request or
suggestion of, any candidate, or any authorized committee or agent of such candidate." 2
U.S.C. § 431(17) (1996).
172. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm'n. v. FEC, 59 E3d 1015 (10th Cir.
1995), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 2309 (1996).
173. Id. at 2312.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 2319.
176. Id. at 2316.
177. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Commn. v. FEC, 116 S. Ct. 2309, 2316-17
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The Court based its decision largely on the presumption that
candidates and political parties function independently.
Although the Court has consistently affirmed the constitutionality
of regulating hard money campaign contributions, it has declined to
extend this holding to soft money contributions. The Court's
reluctance is due primarily to its naive reliance upon a presumption
of independence between candidates and their parties, as well as
the difficulty of obtaining tangible evidence of wrongdoing.

II

REGULATING SoFr MONEY CONTRiBuTIoNs

Recent revelations regarding fund-raising irregularities in the
1996 presidential election highlight the need for stricter federal
regulations on soft money contributions. Such regulations must be
imposed to preserve the integrity of our nation's electoral process.
Although it would be manifestly unfair and inaccurate to suggest
that every large donor gives with the expectation of receiving
perks, a great percentage of large donations, whether from
corporations or individuals, are made with some expectation of
personal gain. 178
Recent trends indicate that although the number of large
contributions has dramatically increased, voter turnout has steadily
declined. For example, in 1996, voter turnout reached a record low
of 48.8% - the lowest turnout since 1924.17 Although five million
more voters were registered in 1996 than in 1992, ten million fewer
persons voted in 1996.180 This disturbing statistic reveals the
public's growing apathy and alienation from the political process,
as well as cynicism toward the nation's elected officials. Opinion
polls indicate that the vast majority of Americans believe our
nation's leaders are bought and paid for by special interest groups
and are, therefore, no longer accountable to voters.1 8' This trend
must be reversed not, however, to create fairness or equal
access to the political process, but rather to deter political
(1996).
178. Nightline, Leon Panetta on the Rules of Political Warfare (ABC television
broadcast, Mar. 5, 1997). In an interview with David Gergen, a top advisor to Presidents
Nixon, Reagan, Ford and Clinton, Gergen opined that "people who give money, give $100,000
apiece or $50,000 apiece, in order to see a member of Congress from either party or to see
the president of the U.S. clearly believe that it's worth paying the price or they wouldn't do
it." Id,
179. Marquez, supra note 11, at A29.
180. Id.
181. Guy Gugliotta, Campaign Primer'sFirstLesson, Cash Flows From Contacts; This
is How Senator 7brriceli Raised $9 Milion Last Year, THE WAsH. Posr, May 18, 1997, at Al.
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corruption, foster objective legislative deliberation, and encourage
more widespread public participation. 18
Opponents to campaign finance reform argue, based on the
Buckley and Colorado Republican cases, that any limits on soft
money contributions would be struck down by the Court as
unconstitutional. 18
This
argument,
however,
completely
misconstrues Supreme Court holdings and the Court's unwavering
commitment to preserving the integrity and underlying principles of
the democratic political process. Campaign finance reform focuses
on limiting contributions, not expenditures. Not only has the Court
affirmed the legislature's imposition of contribution limits, but it
has consistently encouraged such restrictions. Furthermore, the
Court has invariably viewed such legislative action as responsible
and necessary to combat actual or apparent political corruption.
Even if no quid pro quo actually occurred during the 1996 election,
the appearanceof pervasive corruption simply cannot be denied. In
light of the mounting evidence of corruption, Congress has a clear
responsibility to impose further limits on soft money contributions.
Any serious attempt at legislative reform must, however, be rooted
in certain fundamental legal precepts, democratic traditions, and
tenets of human nature.
In a deliberative democracy such as ours, political discourse is
healthy and should be encouraged. Reform must both preserve and
advance the unrestrained political debate that is integral to a
well-informed electorate capable of self-governance. Moreover, as
the Buckley Court opined, public debate on the qualifications of
candidates is essential to our form of government and rooted in the
United State Constitution.1 84 The Supreme Court has consistently
called for a national commitment to promote robust political
debate that simultaneously engenders and signals a healthy
182. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49. Rejecting the notion that government intervention
should promote equal access, the Court stated.
[Tihe concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our

society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First
Amendment, which was designed to secure the widest possible dissemination of
information from diverse and antagonistic sources, and to assure unfettered
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by
the people.

Id.
183. Mason, supra note 148, at A18; CampaignFinance Reform: Hearings on S. 1219
Before the Senate Comm. on Rules and Admin., 105th Cong. (1996) (statement of Joel Gora,
Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School, on behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union).
184. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14-15.
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democracy. l5
As pronounced by the Supreme Court, expenditures for political
speech have absolute protection under the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution. 186 Therefore, apart from a constitutional
amendment, legislative reform is limited solely to addressing
contributions made to candidates or political parties. Capping soft
money contributions would not offend this fundamental
constitutional principle.
Soft money is vital to party-building activities as well as the
dissemination of political expression. 87 Without soft money,
federal, state, and local political parties would be unable to
distribute materials used to educate the electorate regarding the
candidates and their qualifications. Despite the need to stamp out
political corruption, legislators must carefully weigh the potential
adverse effects that completely abolishing soft money would have
on our political system and the dissemination of political
expression.
By virtue of the symbiotic relationship between a candidate and
his or her party, independence-in-fact is neither workable nor
possible.1 88 The Supreme Court of the United States must recognize
this incontrovertible fact, particularly in the wake of the
fund-raising scandals of the 1996 presidential election. Without this
vital recognition, legislative efforts to limit soft money
contributions and to minimize political corruption will ultimately
fail.
That large money contributions are much more likely to result in
quid pro quo than smaller contributions was borne out during the
1996 presidential election cycle.'89 The verity that large and
185. Id. In Buckley, the Court renewed its call for a "profound national commitment to
the principle that debate on public issues should uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." Id. at
14 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). See also Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
186. Colorado Republican, 116 S. Ct. at 2313. "The independent expression of a
political party's views is 'core' First Amendment activity no less than is the independent
expression of individuals, candidates, or other political committees." Id.
187. Campaign Finance Reform, supra note 7. Bradley Smith, a law professor and
historian of federal campaign law, noted that 'when soft money was not allowed in the
systems ...
Congress noted a marked drop off in grass roots party campaigning, as the
presidential campaigns husbanded their limited 'hard money' resources for television ads...
and state, local, and national parties could not spend money for the traditional bumper
stickers, yard signs, slate cards, and other grass roots activities. .
" Id,

188.

Grier, supra note 108, at 1.

189. See Wealthy Donors' Access to White House, supra note 15; Bedard, supra note
14, at Al.
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unlimited contributions encourage corruption is also evidenced by
the very existence of FECAs contribution limits. Regardless of
whether large political contributions are made to a party or a
candidate, the potential distortion of our political system's
deliberative process is substantial and debilitating.
Monetary contributions, as opposed to other direct and indirect
forms of support such as contributions of time and energy, have a
greater corrupting influence on candidates, due to the candidate's
enhanced ability to control monetary donations. 19° Inherent in
FECA is the recognition that monetary, rather than non-monetary,
contributions have the greatest corrupting influence. Limiting
monetary contributions forces candidates to place greater reliance
upon volunteers to win elections. This will have a positive
influence on campaigns.
Quid pro quo is tacitly understood and need not involve direct
coordination between a candidate and potential donor, indirect
contributions through a party are sufficient. 91 By pooling resources
and working together, candidates and political parties have become
increasingly sophisticated and effective in their fund-raising efforts.
Sophisticated contributors understand this aspect of politics as
well, and many attempt to exploit the candidates and political
process through large contributions to the political parties.
Although actual or apparent quid pro quo will never totally be
eliminated, efforts must be instituted to minimize it. 192 Limiting
large soft money contributions will not end political corruption, as
any savvy donor seeking to elicit special favors from a president,
vice president, or congressional leader will inexorably find a way to
190. FECA states that the term "contribution' does not include 'the value of services
provided without compensation by any individual who volunteers on behalf of a candidate or
political committee." 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(B) (1996).
191. See, e.g., Vicki Kemper and Deborah Luterbeck The Country Club; How an Elite
Group of Corporations, Unions, and Super-Rich Individuals is Financing the Political
Parties, Shaping the Political Agenda and Reaping Great Rewards With Huge Soft Money
Contributions,COMMON CAUSE MAGAZNE (Washington, D.C.), Summer 1996.
192. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45. In rejecting limits on independent expenditures, the
Buckley Court opined that such measures would
naively underestimate the ingenuity and resourcefulness of persons and groups
desiring to buy influence to believe that they would have much difficulty devising
expenditures that skirted the restriction on express advocacy of election or defeat the
campaign. Yet no substantial societal interest would be served by a loophole-closing
provision designed to check corruption that permitted unscrupulous persons and
organizations to expend unlimited sums of money in order to obtain improper
influence over candidates for elective office.
Id. This pronouncement illustrates the lack of societal interest in legislating against any and

all behavior aimed at influencing candidates.
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circumvent federal election laws. As a matter of sound policy and
practicability, federal laws cannot effectively regulate these

activities.'9

Rather, campaign finance reform must focus on

preventing and exposing the most egregious and blatant forms of
corruption by making quid pro quo risky and difficult for both
candidate and donor. This goal can be only be reached through
enactment of new federal laws. By capping soft money
contributions in the same manner as hard money contributions, the
opportunity to coordinate quid pro quo is reduced and its effects
mitigated.
A substantial soft money contribution, when solicited by a
candidate and combined with that candidate's knowledge of the
specifics of that donation, encourages political payback and creates
an environment ripe for corruption. Although federal law can seek
to limit solicitation and cap contributions, federal law cannot
restrict communication between candidates and parties nor
should it. Computerization has facilitated candidate awareness of
soft money donations immeasurably, as illustrated by the White
House's reliance upon "Big Brother" to coordinate fund-raising
activities and to track donations to the DNC. The flow of
information regarding donations between candidates and their
national, state, and local committees has vastly improved and is
certain to continue.
Any attempt to draw a functional distinction between candidates
and their parties is paradoxical and futile, particularly with respect
to presidential and vice presidential candidates. As a matter of
course and political design, the president, vice president, and their
national party must communicate regularly and work in tandem to
project a unified voice. Consequently, the flow of information
between a candidate and his party is necessary to maintain this
unified voice and vital to election success. No matter how carefully
crafted, a Chinese wall19 cannot stop information flowing between
candidates and political parties, as both focus on fund-raising to
achieve the same objective victory. Candidates and parties
routinely share names of donors (including their past and expected
193. Id.
194. A "Chinese wall" is a legal fiction that is used to screen a lawyer involved in an
earlier adverse role from other lawyers in the same firm, preventing the entire firm from
being disqualified from subsequently representing adverse parties. BLAcK's LAw DIcTIoNARY
240 (6th ed. 1990). Although generally applied in the context of the legal profession, the
relationship between political candidates and the parties has also been treated in this
manner for purposes of FECA. Grier, supm note 108, at 1.
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contributions) and new strategies and tactics for obtaining more
and larger donations. Candidates and their parties axe
interdependent; this fact cannot be disputed. Consequently, the
United States Supreme Court's presumption of independence-in-fact
is clearly outmoded and must be reconsidered.
The corrupting forces of soft money particularly affect
presidential candidates. The president has unrivaled control over
the management of soft money raised by the national party.
Further, the president has far greater opportunities to reward
bountiful donors than any other nationally-elected official. Unlike
congressional leaders, the president has unique authority to issue
sweeping executive orders; make key diplomatic, agency, and
committee appointments; establish or overturn burdensome
regulations; and shape foreign policy. This authority makes the
president a prime target for individuals and special interest groups
willing to pay top dollar for political favors. Moreover, the
unparalleled prestige of the presidency creates a great demand for
access, enticing individuals to exploit the relationship by seeking
quid pro quo. The mere appearance of a business or personal
connection with a president or vice president invariably enhances a
donor's own image and interests.'9
Candidates and the national parties are mutually dependent,
because a political party's success is directly measured by the
amount of support it generates and the number of its candidates
elected to office. The president plays an integral role in this
process and, as the figurehead of the national party, is ultimately
held accountable for the party's success or failure. The president is
much more effective politically when his party holds a majority of
congressional seats. Due to the great expense of conducting
congressional races, a president must involve himself in extensive
grassroots fund-raising, generating money not only for his own
campaign, but for the benefit of his party's congressional
candidates as well.
In 1996, President Clinton did not seek out or reward small
contributors by inviting them to sleep in the Lincoln Bedroom,
attend White House coffees, travel on Air Force One, or appointing
them to important government positions. Instead, the President
targeted donors willing to make large contributions, many of which
exceeded $25,000. Many individuals who came and gave, expecting
something in return, allegedly did not leave empty-handed.
195.

See LaFraniere, supra note 44, at Al.
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The corrupting forces of soft money on congressional candidates
are attenuated, due to the large number of legislators. Although
there is but one president and one vice president, there are 475
representatives and 100 senators. If the executive and legislative
branches are indeed coequal, then dollar-for-dollar, it is
substantially more costly and difficult for a donor to meaningfully
influence the legislative branch without detection. Moreover, on the
whole, congressional candidates have far less control over soft
money and possess fewer perks to reward would-be donors.
Individual congressional candidates do not bear the same
accountability as the president and vice president for the success
or failure of the national committees efforts to raise cash for
concern
candidates
Congressional
activities.
party-building
themselves more with raising the hard money used directly in their
own campaigns, rather than the party's soft money that only
indirectly benefits them. As a proximate result, congressional
candidates do not feel the same duty to reward donors to national
political committees.
Political parties and their candidates use numerous benchmarks
to evaluate their strength during election cycles, including popular
support measured by both opinion polls and the number of enlisted
campaign volunteers. By far the most important benchmarks,
however, are the amount of money received by a party and the
ability of the party to generate large donations quickly. Parties can
generate funds faster by soliciting unlimited soft money donations
than by soliciting limited hard money contributions. As such, soft
money has become vastly more important in recent political races.
CONCLUSION

The number of individuals seeking to influence the political
process has grown dramatically in recent years. There are many
plausible explanations for this growth. The dramatic increase in
federal regulations over the last several decades has imposed heavy
financial burdens on some businesses, while increasing financial
opportunities for others. Further, the globalization of the market
economy has opened the American market, as well as American
politics, to foreign interests. "Special interests" are no longer
exclusively American. With the rise in economic globalization,
foreign companies and governments now, more than ever before,
have a vested interest in influencing the American political

1997

Awash in Soft Money

process. 196
The corruption that subverted the 1996 federal elections must be
controlled. Capping soft money contributions is the first major step
in overhauling federal campaign laws and restoring the integrity of
our national politics. Several bills have already been introduced in
Congress to regulate soft money. Congressional investigations are
ongoing and will perhaps uncover the sources of corruption that
have adulterated our nation's most venerated institution representative democracy. Someday, the full truth may be exposed
regarding the extent of one of the most blighted tales of money and
guile ever perpetrated upon this country. Judas Iscariot's atonement
came with the price of suicide. How will those who have betrayed
the trust of the American people atone?
Brent A. FeweU

196. See John Daly, Global Connections, Political Giving in the 1996 Elections by
Foreign Agents and US. Subsidiariesof Foreign Companies, Center for Responsive Politics
(1997). This report reveals that 128 American subsidiaries of 93 foreign-owned corporations
contributed soft money in 1996. Id Of the $12.5 million contributed, over $8 million was soft
money. Id.

